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Abstract 
The 1986 Freedom of Information Act amendments were passed as a last-minute rider to Reagan-era War on 
Drugs legislation. The three pieces – a broad restructuring of Exemption 7, the law enforcement exemption; the 
addition of exclusions for law enforcement and intelligence requests; and introduction of a new fee structure – 
have had a lasting impact on FOIA implementation and contribute to the contemporary inability to affect police 
transparency. Review of the 1986 FOIA amendments’ legislative history documents the White House’s 
determination to loosen law enforcement oversight and congressional appeals to exaggerated fears of illicit drug 
users. The study considers the effect on judicial interpretation of Exemption 7, exploring decisions before and 
after the amendments, while also analyzing FOIA use and implementation patterns through a dataset of annual 
reports from 1975 until present. The analysis reveals a sharp increase in Exemption 7 claims and “no records” 
responses, both attributable to the 1986 FOIA amendments. 
On October 20, 2014, 17-year-old Laquan McDonald was shot and killed by a city police officer on the southwest 
side of Chicago. The initial police report documented McDonald lunging at police with a knife causing the officer 
to open fire on the teen.1 A police spokesperson said officers were forced to defend themselves.2 Thirteen 
months later, public release of dashcam video of the events would demonstrate Office Jason Van Dyke was on 
the scene for less than thirty seconds before exiting his cruiser and firing sixteen rounds, and McDonald was, 
contrary to official reports, walking away from police at the time of the shooting.3 
The dashcam footage was only released after multiple denials, a drawn-out appeal and a court order. The 
Chicago Police Department fought dissemination of the recording, having received and rejected fifteen Illinois 
Freedom of Information Act4 requests.5 The department relied on three common law enforcement exemptions 
to justify the denials.6 The Chicago Tribune reported that city officials exchanged emails shortly after McDonald’s 
death, acknowledging the existence of the video and how best to proceed.7 Chicago officials reached a $5 
million settlement with McDonald’s family, and the emails show the city asked the McDonald family not to 
release the video until criminal charges were resolved.8 In a public address, Mayor Rahm Emanuel discouraged 
release of the video, suggesting the dashcam footage would come out at an appropriate time.9 Despite the 
coordinated efforts of city hall, the video would be made public through an appeal of a denied Illinois FOIA 
request. The release of the video would prove pivotal in revealing the nature of McDonald’s death and result in 
a black eye for the city and its police.10 
While the outcome of the Laquan McDonald video case can be construed as a successful application of freedom 
of information law and a victory for police accountability, the result was unusual.11 The law enforcement 
exemptions used in the case by the Chicago Police Department exist in nearly all federal and state freedom of 
information laws and are consistently upheld in courtrooms. These law enforcement exemptions are the 
product of a calculated federal effort to shrink access to law enforcement records. As one piece of omnibus War 
on Drugs legislation, Congress inserted pivotal language in the 1986 amendments to strengthen the hand of 
police by reducing access to law enforcement records.12 
In a time when society is reevaluating police authority and use of force, the primary law for public oversight of 
law enforcement is tilted in favor of police. The passage of the 1986 amendments to the FOIA has proved to be a 
crucial event in providing law enforcement agencies leverage in limiting the release of police records. The 
additional deference to law enforcement exemption claims has resulted in a flawed FOIA process and soaring 
Exemption 7 claims.13 
This article will evaluate the FOIA and its exemptions and exclusions dedicated to law enforcement purposes 
with a particular focus on the 1986 FOIA amendments, Reagan-era alterations passed while the country was 
enthralled by the War on Drugs campaign and insistent on strengthening the hand of police. The study will focus 
exclusively on federal open records law, as most state laws are closely patterned on the federal statute and fall 
in line with new legislative changes and judicial interpretations.14 First, the article explores the state of exception 
theory and the climate of War on Drugs policy in affecting amendments to the FOIA, before tracing federal 
rhetoric in the lead-up to passage of the amendments. The study will explore court opinions on the FOIA and 
Exemption 7 before and after the 1986 alterations and then analyze a dataset of cabinet-level FOIA annual 
reports documenting use and implementation of the access mechanism from 1975 to 2016 to determine the 
impact of the change in the law enforcement exemption’s rhetoric. The discussion and conclusion consider the 
motives and implications of the amendments. 
The War on Drugs 
The 1986 FOIA amendments are one front in the United States’ War of Drugs, the long-running federal initiative 
aimed at eradicating illicit drug use and sales. The War on Drugs – called “one of the defining discourses of the 
20th century”15 – unofficially commenced in 1969 when President Richard Nixon appointed Stephen Hess to 
head a task force responsible for “listen[ing] well to the voices of young Americans – in the universities, on the 
farms, the assembly lines, the street corners”16 in an effort to better understand the American psyche during a 
time of social upheaval that included sustained civil rights protests and the arrival of the counterculture 
movement. The resulting report “forcefully argued for addressing the root causes of drug abuse.”17 President 
Nixon responded less than two months later with marching orders for Congress to address a drug abuse 
problem that had reached “national emergency” status.18 Nixon’s request resulted in legislation, which, among 
other achievements, authorized $1.7 billion toward the drug abuse initiative.19 Notably, Nixon’s new policy 
framed drug abusers as criminals, and it advanced a theory that diminished social welfare spending would 
“attack the root cause of drug abuse.”20 The Nixon White House’s position and efforts regarding illicit drug use 
were hardly novel, but Emily Dufton has suggested President Nixon and company were responsible for a 
powerful paradigm shift that positioned drug users as the locus of many social ills and as a particularly 
recalcitrant motivator of violent crimes.21 Dan Baum suggested that this was not necessarily an unusual notion, 
but one Nixon was responsible for hardwiring into the Republican consciousness.22 The advent of the War on 
Drugs marks a watershed social policy where drug users were framed as a feral threat to society, a threat not 
only necessitating incarceration but exonerating the white middle class from responsibility for urban drug crises. 
The drug epidemic ramped up the imperative of strong police forces and made drug users culpable and 
disposable. 
President Jimmy Carter’s term in office slackened some of the more strident rhetoric and focused federal drug 
efforts on increased treatment options, research of effects, and a turn away from the villainization of 
marijuana.23 However, President Ronald Reagan’s 1980 election would again swing the War on Drugs back to 
Nixon’s original vision for total eradication of illicit drug abuse through aggressive policing efforts and heavy 
punishment. President Reagan’s election was seen as a public mandate, trouncing incumbent Jimmy Carter ten-
to-one in electoral votes. As part of that mandate, President Reagan saw fit to reify his campaign trail credo: 
Government is not the solution; it is the problem.24 
In an early debate among Reagan advisers, a disagreement emerged over the federal government’s role in law 
enforcement with Attorney General William French Smith calling the Justice Department not a domestic agency, 
but, “[T]he internal arm of national defense.”25 Reagan agreed with the expansive interpretation of the Justice 
Department’s objectives, telling his aides, “Law enforcement is something we have always believed was a 
legitimate function of the government.”26 Attorney General Smith believed America to be too soft on criminal 
activity, a sentiment shared by Reagan confidante and Smith’s successor as attorney general, Edwin Meese. 
According to Baum, Meese would declare a solution: “We must increase the power of the prosecutor.”27 Myriad 
strategies were pursued in an effort to strengthen the hand of law enforcement,28 one being a major 
amendment of the FOIA. 
The climate resulting from a front of swirling paranoia surrounding drug use and a federal government 
committed to empowering law enforcement produced FOIA amendments that generally eased agency ability to 
use exemptions, expanded the breadth of the national security and law enforcement exemptions, and codified 
dishonesty as a legitimate response to a FOIA request. Each of these amendments remains on the books, 
diminishing one of the very few avenues for civilian oversight, sapping civic trust with every denied FOIA request 
and every police scandal. The FOIA amendments – simmering since Reagan’s 1980 election, but never popular in 
the House of Representatives – were quickly and quietly tucked into Reagan’s signature War on Drugs 
legislation. The product is one of the most substantial statutory changes to the FOIA since the 1974 
amendments29 inaugurated the contemporary conception of access mechanism. It resulted in dramatic changes 
in the function of the FOIA. The wider social effects of significantly diminished police oversight are incalculable. 
State of Exception 
The dramatic shift in the government’s approach to illegal drugs and the branding of the effort as a kind of 
domestic war is essential to understanding not only the support for and language of the FOIA amendments but 
in the larger project of augmenting law enforcement power and demonstrating a societal need for increased law 
and order. In emphatically pitching and widely distributing the message of the drug crisis, government grew 
public concern and established a rationale for a more robust law enforcement presence. By amplifying a public 
safety concern, the government cleared a runway for more power. The scenario can be viewed as an 
instantiation of the term “state of exception,” where government temporarily exceeds conventional rule of law 
and typical or constitutional powers in a moment of emergency. In instances of states of exception, the 
expansion of authority will meet the perceived threat; thus creating incentive for government to broadly define 
any threat or crisis. 
Carl Schmitt is credited with developing “state of exception,” a legal theory most commonly cited for recognizing 
the locus of power in legal circumventions. He succinctly captured the premise in acknowledging the “sovereign 
is he who decides on the exception.”30 Schmitt’s turn was in arguing everyday law and order to be little more 
than veneer on an unsteady legal system founded on raw power. When threatened, the legal system ruptures 
and exposes the true nature of the political order.31 Schmitt was interested in Max Weber’s theories of 
bureaucratization, though ultimately rejecting the rational-legal basis of objective hierarchy. Weber recognized 
that despite insistence on systematic neutrality our contemporary social order always bends toward the favor of 
those in power. In the words of Martti Koskenniemi, Weber diagnosed “the failure of legal formality in the 
conditions of complex modernity, and highlight[ed] the way bureaucratisation focuses on the decision-maker’s 
preferences or alliances.”32 This is where Schmitt suggests real power and its interests are witnessed. 
Schmitt’s theory lay largely dormant for an extended period of time, at least partially due to his significant role 
in the Nazi regime. State of exception received a hearty revival in the 1990s,33 and use continued to spike after 
publication of Giorgio Agamben’s “State of Exception,” a post-9/11 exploration of human rights.34 In galvanizing 
the theory, Agamben looked at the ways social crises have resulted in diminished rights in democratic nations 
throughout history. He documented war as a common catalyst for instantiation of states of exception. In 
particular, World War I witnessed a number of countries forgoing standard rights in favor of order and 
preparedness.35 While World War I is a conspicuous and large scale state of exception, Agamben traced the 
roots of the legal circumvention in the United States to the Constitution.36 He identified the events surrounding 
the French Revolution as the first modern instance of a state of exception,37 and it is in the United States’ own 
internecine fighting that it is first witnessed domestically. 
A principal point in the book is the obstinate nature of the legal exception and the successful grafting of a 
succession of exceptions onto the legal code. David Cole cataloged the number of statutes that allowed for 
curtailment of typical rights: “The United States has been under one state of emergency or another since 1933; 
by the end of the mid-1970s, there were more than 470 ‘emergency’ laws on the books.”38 Agamben judged this 
to be no accident: “The modern state of exception is instead an attempt to include the exception itself within 
the juridical order by creating a zone of indistinction in which fact and law coincide.”39 
Jules Lobel has documented the perpetual state of emergency and its ameliorating force on civil liberties. He has 
labelled government efforts to create a pervasive anxiety as manipulative, suggesting exaggeration of threats to 
be deliberate.40 Lobel wrote, “The effect of both the ideology and reality of permanent crisis has dramatically 
transformed the constitutional boundaries between emergency and non-emergency powers. First, the premise 
that emergency was a short, temporary departure from the normal rule of law is no longer operative. 
Emergency rule has become permanent.”41 
The Supreme Court has considered the state of exception on a number of occasions, notably in Schenck v. 
United States,42 Korematsu v. United States43 and Dennis v. United States.44 In Schenck, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, acknowledged the infringement of First Amendment rights, but found 
the war-time conditions necessitated such actions: “We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the 
defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”45 He then famously compared the 
abridgement of speech critical of war activities to falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater. Justice Holmes first 
mentioned “clear and present danger” in the opinion, but also focused on the “substantive evil” that must exist 
for government to curtail expression.46 In Schenck, the Court found disparaging the military draft to meet such a 
threshold; military efforts were sufficient grounds for a state of exception. 
Despite questioning the constitutionality of the quarantining of individuals of Japanese 
heritage,47 the Korematsu Court found in favor of the government, citing the small hop from an enforced curfew 
to mandatory detention. Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black suggested the temporary restraint on an 
ethnicity’s free movement compared favorably to clearing the area around a fire.48 Justice Black recognized the 
extreme nature of the detainment but found the action equal to the threat, writing: 
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes except under circumstance of direct 
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic government institutions. But when under conditions 
of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be 
commensurate with the threatened danger.49 
Again, military efforts were justification for a state of exception, and here detention was the equal of the 
purported Japanese threat. 
The Supreme Court decided a case not unlike Schenck in 1951, finding another legitimate abridgement of free 
expression. The secretary of the Communist Party was found in violation of the Smith Act50 for the party’s 
general revolutionary philosophy. It was determined that a non-capitalist ideology justified limitations on civil 
liberties.51 Though the Communist Party of the United States held no exigent plans to overthrow the 
government, its latent interest in revolution was deemed to be a clear and probable danger. The Supreme Court 
echoed the lower court’s opinion, “In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by 
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”52 In his concurrence, 
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote, “Civil liberties draw at best only limited strength from legal 
guaranties.”53 In Dennis, the Court found that rights and liberties may be constrained not only in a time of 
emergency but in instances where the mere potential for evil is apparent.54 Thirty-two years after Schenck, a 
state of exception occurs without military efforts. The pervasive anxiety of the Red Scare was sufficient. 
These cases demonstrate the malleability of legal thought when confronted with perceived emergencies, 
especially of a particular kind of national security threat. That fundamental rights like freedom of expression and 
movement can be abridged under the right circumstances suggests courts are likely not an effective backstop in 
the face of ingrained, widespread public fear.55 
Scholars have traced the state of exception to limitations on access to government information. In an article 
exploring this phenomenon, Jane Kirtley found the government’s post-9/11 efforts to curtail the public’s right to 
know manifold.56 She highlighted the White House’s duplicitous leverage: “In the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks, the Bush administration continued to exploit legitimate concerns about disclosing sensitive information 
to potential terrorists as a justification for greater secrecy.”57 David Pozen found judicial review inadequate in 
determining rights in the face of a national security threat.58 In discussing a rise in the use of the mosaic theory 
in short-circuiting the FOIA process, he described the conditions accompanying the increase and the judicial 
review of the legal claim: 
[M]osaic-making and information generally have taken on a new salience in the national security 
strategy after 9/11, with today’s mosaic threats more numerous and speculative than ever before…I 
conclude that, whatever its risk-reducing potential, [the prevailing judicial review of mosaic theory] is 
legally unjustified and practically unwise.59 
Christine Wells highlighted a long history of leveraging moments of national crisis for long-term rollbacks of 
government transparency: 
Secrecy with respect to national security is important, but the natural tendency of bureaucrats to rely on 
it – understandably exacerbated in times of crisis-threatens to engulf FOIA’s purpose. Historically, 
secrecy has continued well beyond identifiable crises, becoming entrenched in even routine matters. 
The fact that government officials believe the country has subsisted in a constantly threatened state for 
much of the last 50 years due to the Cold War and terrorism suggests that executive officials will 
continue to invoke the national security rationale to justify even greater withholding of government 
information.60 
Whatever the intentions of those pursuing policy changes under the auspices of the War on Drugs, the branding 
of the efforts and the conflation of domestic policy with active military operations bears significance in ensuring 
a wider authority in diminishing or transferring civilian rights and privileges. The broadest projection of the 
threat of illicit drugs is likely to return the widest federal authority, thus a war and not new federal guidelines or 
government program. By defining the efforts as an emergency, the state of exception becomes operative. And 
while the urgency or even viability of the War on Drugs as a policy effort has faded – as Agamben and Lobel 
warned – much of the statutory regime remains, including the 1986 FOIA amendments. 
Legislation & Executive Guidance 
Once the staff and cabinet were in place, the Reagan administration immediately set about making changes to 
the FOIA. Four months into his term, Attorney General William French Smith released guidance signaling a 
Department of Justice more inclined to defend agency non-disclosure decisions.61 In October 1981, Senator Orin 
Hatch introduced two bills aimed at overhauling the FOIA.62 While neither made it out of committee, a startling 
number of changes were proposed. The 1981 bills would introduce the core of the 1986 FOIA Reform Act, 
including the law enforcement exemption modifications and new fee structure. There is a clear legislative 
through-line between the 1981 efforts of Hatch and Smith and the 1986 FOIA amendments. Early in Reagan’s 
first term in office, it became clear that influential forces had dramatic change in mind for the FOIA, and Smith’s 
guidance and Hatch’s bills announced a new FOIA regime was afoot. 
After five years of foment, these early endeavors would materialize as the Freedom of Information Reform Act 
of 1986,63 the short form title for the subsection of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act64 dedicated to the FOIA. The 
amendments announced three significant changes to the existing statutory scheme; three alterations that 
remain in effect to this day. In line with President Reagan’s overall aim of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the Freedom 
of Information Reform Act was explicitly focused on increasing law enforcement powers by diluting elements of 
the FOIA. In his signing statement, President Reagan called the amendments important because statutory 
changes would “considerably enhance the ability of Federal law enforcement agencies… to combat drug 
offenders and other criminals,” acknowledging he had sought such changes since 1981.65 The amendments 
reconfigure Exemption 7, the law enforcement exception; added “exclusions,” information categories where 
records are lawfully excised from the FOIA process; and further refined the fee structure. 
As is custom, the Justice Department released influential guidance for the amendments, providing legal 
interpretation of the new legal elements, while also explaining the vision and the motives of the 1986 FOIA 
amendments.66 In the introduction, Attorney General Edwin Meese provided two recurring themes espoused by 
supporters of the amendments. First, he called the 1974 FOIA amendments an overcorrection that “seriously 
impaired the ability of federal law enforcement agencies to perform their crucial mission of protecting our 
citizenry.”67 Meese stated that “the Freedom of Information Reform Act recognizes and is principally designed to 
set right” the prior miscalculation.68 Second, he pointed to the 1981 congressional testimony of FBI Director 
William H. Webster, warning of “sophisticated requesters” prying loose sensitive information to the 
“impairment of vital law enforcement interests” as a catalyst for the amendments.69 Similar testimony on the 
inconvenience of the FOIA from law enforcement officials was commonplace in the build-up to passage of the 
1986 amendments. 
Notably, the 1986 FOIA Reform Act was a floor amendment at the close of the legislative session, thus leaving 
behind little immediate legislative history. The FOIA amendments were fairly unpopular, and their arrival as a 
rider to sweeping so-called “tough on crime” legislation was no accident. Oklahoma Representative Glenn 
English, an advocate for FOIA reform,70 expressed misgivings about the haste of the amendments,71 as did 
Representative Tom Kindness, English’s ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Government 
Information,72 though both would ultimately support the bill. Because of its passage as a floor amendment, 
there are no committee reports, no conference reports and scant congressional comment. A very similar bill 
introduced in 1983 would also fail,73 and much of its legislative history is illustrative in interpreting the 1986 
amendments. The 1983 bill – also introduced by Hatch – contained similar Exemption 7 changes, establishment 
of the exclusions and a new fee system that were passed as part of the 1986 amendments, but it also 
represented wider and more sweeping changes to the FOIA system, including further protections for business 
confidentiality and personal privacy and would have codified six “unusual circumstances” for a thirty-business 
day extension.74 The Senate would pass the 1983 amendments, but the bill never made it out of committee in 
the House of Representatives. Concurrently, efforts were made to diminish other aspects of the FOIA, including 
Senator Barry Goldwater introducing the CIA Information Act75 in 1983, a law signed by President Reagan a year 
later that provides a categorical FOIA exclusion for the procedural files of the CIA, effectively placing the 
intelligence organization outside of public oversight. 
Exemption 7 
The changes to Exemption 7 signal one of the more significant alterations in FOIA history, changes with a clear 
motive – reducing the flow of government records from federal law enforcement agencies. Each piece of the 
Exemption 7 alterations – new language for the threshold, a diluted harm standard, and altered verbiage in 
three of the six sub-exemptions – made non-disclosure of law enforcement records more likely. Prior to 1986, 
the threshold for qualifying for an Exemption 7 claim had required the information to be sufficiently 
investigatory in character.76 The 1986 amendments lowered the mark: records or information need only “be 
compiled for law enforcement purposes.”77 The previous standard allowed for the withholding of information 
that related to specific policing practices, while the new threshold is considerably more ambiguous in allowing 
for non-disclosure of any records that relate to law enforcement activities. The harm standard – as applied to 
Exemptions 7(A) (ongoing proceedings), Exemption 7(C) (personal privacy), 7(D) (law enforcement sources) and 
7(F) (physical safety) – was also significantly lowered. In order to accommodate one of the exemptions, past 
standards required release of the information that would threaten the sought protections.78 The new standard 
only necessitates release of information that “could reasonably be expected to” harm one of the identified sub-
exemptions.79 In amending Exemption 7(D), the statute adopted a wider range of acceptable source protections, 
adding an array of “state, local, or foreign or authority or any private institution”80 to the list of non-disclosable 
sources. The changes to Exemption 7(E) included additional language permitting non-disclosure of more internal 
law enforcement activities, covering prosecutorial techniques and law enforcement guidelines.81 Exemption 7(F) 
was amended to allow for non-disclosure of information that may pose a threat to any individual, law officer or 
otherwise.82 
In his signing statement, President Reagan affirmed that the Exemption 7 amendments were intended to 
provide law enforcement more control over the release of requested records.83 The attorney general’s guidance 
explained that the excision of “investigatory” from the threshold language was due to judicial difficulty in 
interpreting investigatory and non-investigatory records.84 Meese also made the unusual move of identifying 
specific record sets that were now to be considered exempt according to the new statutory language.85 Congress 
explained the purpose of the statutory change as expanding Exemption 7 to a wider range of societal threats, 
not merely the events of daily policing. In introducing the amendment to Exemption 7, Senator Patrick Leahy, a 
long-time member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, warned of the specter of “sophisticated criminal 
enterprises” utilizing the FOIA for nefarious ends.86 Hatch said the law enforcement exemption amendments 
were “added protection for foreign counterintelligence and terrorism records.”87 In accord with the larger 
motive of the bill, Hatch observed, “This section will directly improve drug enforcement,” before citing the Drug 
Enforcement Agency’s dissatisfaction with the FOIA.88 Hatch suggested the harm of the FOIA on law 
enforcement to be incalculable, as “many investigations are aborted, compromised, or reduced in scope 
because of FOIA exposure.”89 Hatch also produced his 1983 law review article, in support of a bill of his own 
sponsorship, aimed at further refining the balance between transparency and confidentiality in law 
enforcement.90 He expressed the common refrain among those interested in altering Exemption 7: 
The end product of these problems is an unfortunate overemphasis upon disclosure at the expense of 
confidentiality necessary to law enforcement investigations and informants. In fact, (b)(7) provides a 
reminder that disclosure may endanger the life of an informant or a suspected informant whose identity 
may be revealed by piecing together released FBI documents.91 
In the article, Hatch again referenced the FBI’s disagreement with the presiding FOIA standards, providing an 
anecdote about Gary Bowdach, a convicted murder seeking information on a possible informant.92 Hatch 
highlighted enterprises with the incentive and resources to systematically reconstruct disparate information to 
devastating effect, warning, “There is much evidence of the existence of sophisticated networks of organized 
FOIA requesters.”93 Leahy said the public would lose little in the way of transparency, while interpretation would 
be improved.94 Members of the House were significantly less alarmed. English, while ultimately in agreement 
with the Exemption 7 alterations, found, “[T]he broad complaints of the law enforcement community about the 
negative effects of the FOIA were greatly exaggerated.”95 
Exclusions 
In codifying exclusions, the 1986 amendments introduced a new practice to the FOIA system. Exclusions provide 
“any agency possessing records [of three defined record categories] to treat them as not subject to the 
requirements of the FOIA.”96 In effectively removing classes of information from public review or recourse, this 
power allows agencies to return a “no records” reply to a requester despite the existence of responsive records. 
The three classes of information are of a similar caste, each applying to federal policing or surveillance powers. 
Exclusion (c)(1) provides exclusion powers to records involved in an on-going criminal investigation, identical to 
Exemption 7(A), but with the additional provision that the agency must have reason to believe that “the subject 
of the investigation or proceeding is not aware of its pendency”97 and thought to represent “a possible violation 
of criminal law.”98 Exclusion (c)(2) allows for exclusion when a third party requests informant records held by a 
criminal law enforcement agency.99 The third exclusion, (c)(3), removes from the FOIA process FBI records 
“pertaining to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, or international terrorism;” or information that exists 
as classified.100 
In his published guidance for the amendments, Attorney General Meese acknowledged sensitive information 
necessitated the creation of “an entirely new mechanism.”101 Again, the motive is sophisticated entities crafting 
clever records requests querying law enforcement about potential investigations. Meese stated that exclusion 
was the last resort: “This is the only effective way to avoid the ‘tip off’ problem.’”102 Hatch identified a similar 
motive for amendment of exclusions as for expansion of Exemption 7, suggesting exclusions as a method for 
sewing up some “massive loopholes,” acknowledging that “drugs and organized crime constitutes a special 
problem under the FOIA.”103 In supporting (c)(2), Senator Jeremiah Denton again recalled FBI Director William H. 
Webster’s 1981 testimony, where he stated there were 125 cases in which individuals refused to cooperate for 
fear of being outed by a FOIA release.104 Denton warned that enemy states and interests were using the FOIA 
against the United States.105 
Judicial Interpretation 
Exemption 7 has been one of the most heavily adjudicated of the FOIA exemptions, including multiple Supreme 
Court cases focusing on the law enforcement exemption. The significant changes in the policing provision are 
partially due to frequent change in the statutory language. After the 1986 amendments, federal courts 
established a new “central purpose” for the FOIA and reconsidered fundamental elements of Exemption 7. In 
the twenty years prior to the War on Drugs-influenced amendments, courts were especially interested in 
deliberating the legitimacy of actions in creation of federal police records, whether there was a lawful 
investigatory motive to police action that produced the records. Courts were concerned with protecting the 
integrity of investigations and those implicated in their actions but sought to allow for transparency when 
investigations and their parties were not vulnerable. The 1986 amendments excised this concern, and the courts 
explicitly identified this as carving out a wider legal berth for nondisclosure of police records. 
Pre-Amendment 
National Labor Relations Board v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.106 is perhaps the most illustrative of cases on the 
pre-1986 amendments. The Court marked “investigatory” as a term of particular interest in adjudication. The 
decision capped a series of lower court cases exploring the breadth of the law enforcement exemption. 
Ultimately, the Court reversed the circuit court decision and provided an expansive reading of “investigatory,” 
determining that release of witness statements given to the National Labor Relations Board would interfere with 
enforcement proceedings and were appropriately withheld under Exemption 7(A).107 In Robbins, the Supreme 
Court also offered an interpretation of the 1974 FOIA amendments to Exemption 7, circumscribing the limits of 
“investigatory.”108 The Court found the amendments were to help clarify Exemption 7, not alter the original 
intent of the statute, nor tilt the law enforcement exemption in favor of disclosure or secrecy. The Court 
broadened Exemption 7 in Robbins, finding any general interference with enforcement proceedings – of any 
kind – legitimized an Exemption 7(A) claim. In a dissent, Justices Lewis Powell and William Brennan suggested 
too much discretion was given to the term “investigatory,” and they drew a finer definition around enforcement 
proceedings, requiring them to be both imminent and adjudicatory.109 
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided FBI v. Abramson,110 another influential Exemption 7 case. Journalist Howard 
Abramson had sought records transmitted from the FBI to the White House. Abramson primarily focused on one 
memorandum and sixty-three accompanying pages of material.111 The memo and additional files were from FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover to John D. Erlichman, a Nixon aide, and were transmitted by Hoover in response to a 
White House request for information on eleven political opponents. The records were denied under Exemptions 
6 and 7(C), and the district court upheld the Exemption 7(C) claim despite acknowledging, “[T]he FBI had failed 
to show the information was compiled for law enforcement rather than political purposes.”112 The D.C. Circuit 
reversed, determining the FBI failed to demonstrate the motive for original compilation of the material was 
investigatory and Exemption 7(C) could not be invoked regardless of the personal privacy at stake.113 
In deciding Abramson, the Supreme Court outlined the prevailing Exemption 7 interpretation, then established a 
two-part test for law enforcement claims: “First, a requested document must be shown to have been an 
investigatory record ‘compiled for the law enforcement purpose.’ If so, the agency must demonstrate that 
release of the material would have one of the six results specified by the Act.”114 The Court decided the records 
were, in fact. compiled for law enforcement purposes, and intra-government requests for the records did not 
change their original status. There were four dissenters. Justices Harry Blackmun and William Brennan explicitly 
addressed the “investigatory” element of the statute, questioning the majority opinion’s broad reading of 
“records.”115 Justices Felix Frankfurter and Thurgood Marshall filed a dissenting opinion questioning the majority 
opinion’s expansive interpretation of the statutory language.116 The case turned on the availability of derivative 
records, but the opinion emphasized the necessity of an investigation, a significant distinction in Exemption 7 
jurisprudence.117 There was disagreement between the justices about the disclosure status of records 
transmitted for political purposes, but a consensus formed on the necessity of a legitimate investigation.118 
The same year the Supreme Court decided Abramson, the D.C. Circuit decided a similar case. The court further 
refined the interpretation of Exemption 7 in Pratt v. Webster,119 calling the case “a logical sequel 
to” Abramson.120 In Pratt – which was heard neigh concurrently to the Supreme Court’s hearing of Abramson - 
the D.C. Circuit took the opportunity to establish its own test for “investigatory records compiled for law 
enforcement purposes.”121 
Pratt involved the eponymous appellant, Elmer G. Pratt, a former officer of the Black Panther Party, seeking all 
FBI records referencing or related to his own name. He received the bulk of responsive documents, but twenty 
were withheld under Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D). The undisclosed documents were generated as part of FBI 
Counter-Intelligence Program investigations of the Black Panther Party. The district court determined the twenty 
records should be disclosed as they were created without a “legitimate law enforcement purpose.”122 The 
government boldly contended that the FBI, due to its investigatory mission, was wholly absolved from 
demonstrating withheld records satisfied the Exemption 7 threshold. In Pratt, the FBI advanced a belief that all 
FBI records per se qualified for the law enforcement exemption.123 The D.C. Circuit called the suggestion 
“untenable,” referencing the political purpose of the FBI’s transmission of records in Abramson and setting out a 
three-part threshold test for Exemption 7.124 Highlighting the statutory language, to reach that threshold a 
record must (1) be an investigatory record, (2) have been compiled for law enforcement purposes, and (3) 
satisfy the requirements of one of the six law enforcement sub-exemptions.125 The D.C. Circuit ruled against the 
release of the COINTELPRO documents – suggesting better remedies for such malfeasance – but the decision’s 
discussion of a “rational nexus” would prove enlightening.126 To demonstrate a rational nexus, an agency must, 
“[E]stablish that its investigatory activities are realistically based on a legitimate concern that federal laws have 
been or may be violated or that national security may be breached.”127 The decision further expanded the 
interpretation of Exemption 7, a move acknowledged by the court, calling the interpretation “necessarily 
deferential.”128 
In examining the trajectory of Robbins, Abramson and Pratt, the federal courts grapple with the appropriate 
interpretation of “investigatory.” In Abramson, they determine having “investigation” in the agency title is not 
sufficient. They develop a two-prong test, then a three-part test and conclude with the necessity of a rational 
nexus, a bar requiring substantial proof of a legitimate investigation. It is a careful, decades-long refinement of 
the law enforcement exemption, and it is terminated with the 1986 amendments. 
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee 
In one of the most influential and frequently cited cases in all of FOIA adjudication, Department of Justice v. 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,129 the Supreme Court confronted the law enforcement 
exemption post-1986 amendments. Most famous for Justice John Paul Stevens dictating the purpose of the 
FOIA,130 detailing “practical obscurity,”131 and as a key decision in the building momentum for recognizing 
expansive privacy rights in open records laws, the decision also stands as a clear interpretation of the new 
Exemption 7 language. Justice Stevens’s opinion would not only provide unequivocal direction for future law 
enforcement exemption implementation but also acknowledged the amendments as deliberately less favorable 
to disclosure. Reporters Committee marks a turn in Exemption 7 administration, and the opinion addressed the 
1986 amendments as a clear signal for change. 
The case centered on a FOIA request submitted to the FBI seeking criminal records on members of a known 
organized crime family.132 The request was spurred by interest in the family’s numerous state contracts. After an 
initial denial and appeal, the FBI provided records on three dead members of the family, but withheld 
information on the fourth, living, individual under Exemption 7(C). The appeal argued that the living member’s 
criminal past had already individually been made public. A rap sheet – a summary of previous crimes – 
presented nothing that was not already publicly known.133 
The crux of the decision hinged on whether privacy rights outweighed the public interest in knowing his criminal 
past. Ultimately, the Court found in favor of privacy, largely due to an inchoate fear of easily accessible digital 
information. Notably absent in the opinion’s considerable discussion on the nature of privacy and whether the 
FBI’s claim met the Exemption 7 threshold is any debate on the investigatory status of the records. In fact, in 
outlining the parameters of the statute early in the opinion, two footnotes hold conversations on the impact of 
the 1986 amendments, characterizing the Exemption 7 alterations to “represent a considerable congressional 
effort to ‘ease considerably a Federal law enforcement agency’s burden in invoking [Exemption 7]’”134 and its 
aims “to give the Government greater flexibility in responding to FOIA requests for law enforcement records or 
information.”135 More directly, the majority recognized Congress’s intent to provide law enforcement agencies 
more latitude in withholding requested records, observing that the privacy protections in Exemption 7 
outstripped the protections in the personal privacy exemption, Exemption 6.136 The opinion explicitly addressed 
the 1986 amendments and changing “would constitute” to the more liberal “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute,” which Stevens called a more favorable standard than other nondisclosure categories.137 The D.C. 
Circuit found that the minor rhetorical switch “relieves the agency of the burden of proving to a certainty” any 
potential harms.138 
Reporters Committee stands as judicial confirmation of the 1986 amendments and the impact it wrought on law 
enforcement secrecy. In plain language, the Court acknowledged the wider legal space for police nondisclosure. 
The decision stands as recognition of Senator Hatch’s intent to strengthen the hand of law 
enforcement via limiting law enforcement transparency. Reporters Committee produced dramatic new 
directions for the FOIA – a “central purpose” is determined and a categorical balancing of privacy over public 
interest is adopted – but these outcomes are unlikely if they do not arrive in concert with the political 
orchestration of an illicit drug crisis and legislative signal to ease nondisclosure measures. 
Post-Amendment 
Four years after Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court considered another Exemption 7 case and again made 
direct reference to the impact of the 1986 FOIA amendments. In Department of Justice v. Landano,139 the Court 
decided the applicability of another of the six sub-exemptions, Exemption 7(D). Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor cited the amendments and the Reporters Committee opinion on the subtle 
language alteration, calling the statutory change and subsequent judicial interpretation an effort “to ease the 
Government’s burden of invoking Exemption 7.”140 The Supreme Court continued to identify the broader, more 
liberal language of the 1986 amendments as a primary purpose of the legislation. In National Archives and 
Records Administration v. Favish,141 Justice Anthony Kennedy called the difference between privacy protections 
in Exemption 6 and 7 “no mere accident in drafting. We knew Congress gave special consideration to the 
language in Exemption 7(C) because it was the result of specific amendments to an existing statute.”142 
During the 1990s, the D.C. Circuit would decide a series of Exemption 7 cases that interpreted the 1986 
amendments as a signal to expand law enforcement’s rein in using Exemption 7. In SafeCard Services v. 
SEC,143 the court considered a case where the SEC investigated suspicions of illegal stock transactions. The 
opinion cited Reporters Committee in determining whether the privacy of the subjects of the investigation 
outweighed the value of transparency. The D.C. Circuit ruled emphatically in favor of privacy and 
nondisclosure.144 The decision established Exemption 7(C) as an especially strong denial measure, not to be 
overruled unless an individual can demonstrate strong suspicions of agency misconduct, significantly extending 
the Reporters Committee balancing of privacy over public interest.145 
A year later, the D.C. Circuit again found in favor of law enforcement nondisclosure.146 The case involved FBI 
recordings that were once played in a public court setting. Information revealed to the public cannot be 
withheld according to a FOIA exemption, but there was no documentation of what parts of the recordings were 
played during the hearing. The D.C. Circuit decided the informant tapes were to be withheld according to 
Exemption 7(D) unless it could be demonstrated exactly what information had be previously disclosed.147 Citing 
both Reporters Committee and SafeCard, the opinion doubled down, stating were Exemption 7(D) to become 
inapplicable, Exemption 7(C) would suit the purpose. Despite acknowledging “some of the asserted privacy 
concerns admittedly appear relatively insignificant,”148 the court empathized with the individuals identified on 
the tapes: “We can easily imagine the embarrassment and reputational harm that would be caused from 
disclosure of conversations that…describe ‘a former federal cabinet member’s drinking and dating while on a 
business trip’ and that refer to ‘numerous politicians…as being subject to influence.’”149 The court found next to 
no public interest in the mafia figure’s political connections.150 
Shortly after the 1992 presidential election, The Nation magazine sought records on presidential candidate H. 
Ross Perot and his involvement with U.S. Customs Service’s drug interdiction efforts.151 The agency supplied a 
Glomar response – “neither confirm nor deny the existence of any records”152 – substantiated by Exemption 
7(C). Prior to entering politics, Perot was an anti-drug zealot in Texas.153 The Nation claimed its request was 
motivated by reporting on the privatization of federal policing and Perot’s own public comments and campaigns. 
The court took the unusual step of addressing the SafeCard decision, walking back the categorical exemption of 
names, addresses and other identifiers, especially in cases where individuals had disclosed a connection with an 
agency, effectively waiving certain privacies. The D.C. Circuit ordered the district court to reconsider the 
appropriateness of Exemption 7(C) according to the Reporters Committee balancing test. Ultimately, the district 
court found a refined Glomar response was satisfactory and in line with the purpose of the law enforcement 
exemption.154 Not only did the federal courts find Exemption 7(C) as valid grounds for nondisclosure, it was 
determined sufficient to withhold even confirming the existence of records related to a subject a presidential 
candidate frequently and openly discussed and which was documented in the agency’s own memo. 
The Supreme Court would also cite the 1986 amendments in deciding Milner v. Navy,155 the case where the 
Court struck down High 2.156 The Court considered the possible redundancy of High 2 and Exemption 
7(E),157 before Justice Elena Kagan observed the 1986 amendments amended Exemption 7, not Exemption 2, 
and such alterations “codified Crooker’s158 ‘circumvention of the law’ standard.”159 The Court found High 2 and 
Exemption 7(E) to be largely redundant and removed High 2 from the exemption spectrum and implicitly 
directed all circumvention of law concerns to Exemption 7(E). Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence called the 1986 
amendments an intentional broadcasting and clear effort to increase application after “investigation” was 
removed from the statute.160 
The post-1986 Exemption 7 judicial trajectory unmistakably documented the continued widening of Exemption 7 
with opinions using Reporters Committee as a refraction point for new vectors in law enforcement 
secrecy. Favish, SafeCard, Davis and Nation Magazine, and other cases,161 demonstrate an interpretation 
increasingly tipping toward law enforcement secrecy and personal privacy, establishing new areas of 
nondisclosure and a stronger position on previous views. 
Privacy 
The interpretation and administration of Exemption 7 cannot be properly considered without recognizing the 
balance between the right to know and the right be left alone. In contemplating privacy vis-a-vis the FOIA, the 
two provisions for privacy, Exemptions 6 and 7(C), are considered in tandem, as the history of privacy and the 
two provisions are inextricably intertwined. Perhaps no one has analyzed this issue of privacy and the FOIA more 
closely than Martin Halstuk, who has produced a series of articles exploring privacy and democratic values, 
many focused on the intersection of privacy and the right to know,162 culminating in a co-authored 2006 survey 
of the subject.163 Halstuk and Bill Chamberlin highlighted three Supreme Court cases as responsible for shaping 
the FOIA-related privacy framework.164 They posit the decisions in Department of State v. Washington Post 
Co.,165 Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press166 and National Archives and 
Records Administration v. Favish167 as principally responsible for the ever-expanding privacy rationale for 
exclusions to FOIA. 
In Washington Post, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, determined that passport 
and citizenship documentation was to be included in the “similar file” clause of Exemption 6.168 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist provided an inclusive interpretation of the clause,169 marking an early, pre-1986 amendments, 
decision in the path toward recognizing increased privacy rights. Halstuk and Chamberlin highlight Reporters 
Committee as a dramatic swing in establishing privacy rights over transparency concerns.170 Favish built on the 
foundation of Washington Post and Reporters Committee, extending privacy interests to relatives. Justice 
Anthony Kennedy developed a “sufficient reason” threshold, requiring a requester to provide evidence of ample 
public interest when personal privacy was at stake. The “sufficient reason” threshold alone is a noteworthy blow 
to FOIA’s foundational principle of a presumption of openness, but Justice Kennedy went further in demanding 
requesters provide evidence of potential government misconduct prior to receiving government records 
branded with Exemption 7(C).171 
Halstuk and Chamberlin concluded that despite Congress’s effort to balance privacy rights with transparency, 
the Supreme Court had reset the balance significantly in favor of privacy over disclosure.172 There is no doubt 
that the growing societal concern for personal privacy affected the growth of Exemption 7 claims, but it is the 
author’s contention that the ascent of privacy rights in FOIA is primarily opportunism grafted onto the legislative 
changes driven by War on Drugs rhetoric and efforts to shield law enforcement from transparency. 
Data Analysis 
The analysis herein is premised on a database created by acquiring cabinet-level department FOIA annual 
reports from enactment of the reporting requirement in 1975 to 2016. The 1974 FOIA amendment initiated an 
annual reporting obligation where all agencies subject to the law would be required to submit annual reports 
documenting the prior year’s administration of the FOIA.173 Prior to the 1974 amendment, the FOIA was 
considered weak and grievously flawed,174 and the annual reports were intended to allow for “adequate 
Congressional oversight of freedom of information activities.”175 The categories comprising the annual report 
have shifted over time but have consistently tracked a wide range of information on requests processed, 
requests denied, administrative closures, exemption claims, appeals, costs, fees collected and temporal 
components. This use and implementation data present a relatively consistent series of snapshots of incoming 
FOIA requests and how cabinet-level departments have administered to the requests. The fifteen cabinet-level 
departments (and their preceding agencies) – as the primary administrators of the FOIA, receiving about 80% of 
all requests – were selected as the sample. The study gathered the annual reports using three methods. The 
FOIA statute requires annual reports be posted on agency websites after 1998. Agencies are also required to 
submit the annual reports to committees of the Senate and House of Representatives (and these congressional 
records are held by the National Archives & Records Administration). Some departments have retained the 
annual reports in their own archives and are subject to to FOIA requests. The search – between online postings, 
a two-week visit to the National Archives and individual FOIA requests – returned 557 of the 599 annual, or a 
93% capture rate.176 
For the purposes of FOIA annual report analysis, there are generally three eras, each prompted by a statutory 
amendment changing the FOIA annual report: 1975-1997, with the 1974 FOIA amendments177 commencing the 
annual report obligation; 1998-2007, initiated by the 1996 EFOIA amendment;178 and 2008-2016, a response to 
the 2007 OPEN Government Act.179 This study, most interested in the 1986 FOIA Reform Act, further refined the 
first era of analysis to pre-enactment (1975-1986) and post-enactment (1987-1997), allowing for consideration 
of the immediate effects of the amendment, while retaining the same character of the first analytical period. 
Exploring the sub-exemptions to Exemption 7 also posed a challenge, as agencies were not required to provide 
specific usage figures on the six sub-exemptions until 1998. However, the Departments of Justice and Labor 
provide divided data for the entirety of the study period, and, thus are analyzed as the only consistent source of 
sub-exemption data. There has been a significant amount of research, both domestic and international, that has 
explored similar data.180 
Exemption 7 
Since the introduction of the annual reporting requirement, the law enforcement exemption has accounted for 
a sizeable number of exemption claims. From 1975 onward, the exemption never totaled less than 30% of 
aggregate exemptions in any year. As the threshold for all Exemption 7 use was broadened, total law 
enforcement exemptions claims demonstrate an increase after the 1986 amendments. It comprised 38% of all 
exemption claims in the dozen years of data prior to enactment of the 1986 amendment. From 1987 until 2016, 
Exemption 7 has accounted for 45% of aggregate exemption use. In comparing the twelve-year period prior to 
enactment, 1975 to 1986, and the eleven years period prior the next amendment, 1987 to 1997, Exemption 7 
claims climb 275%, amounting to 41% of all exemptions over the period. The era marks a generally more 
permissive climate for exemption claims and overall FOIA use continues to rise, with total FOIA requests rising 
106% over the same time period. The three percentage-point increase does not seem especially noteworthy, but 
given the rising use and exemption figures, the increase is significant and marks the beginning of a sustained 
climb in Exemption 7 claims. 
Table 1. Exemption 7 Claims 
Time Period Ex. 7 Claims % of Total Ex. Claims 
1975 - 1986 170,471 38.2 
1987 - 1997 586,206 41.4 
1987 – 2016 3,774,422 45.1 
 
Table 2 No Records Closures 










After the 1986 amendments, the percentage of law enforcement exemption claims relative to total claims has 
grown steadily, if not linearly. In the most recent period of analysis, 2008-2016, Exemption 7 accounted for 49% 
of all exemption claims. That figure for the years 2015 and 2016 was even higher, at 57%. Succinctly, Exemption 
7 was approximately one-third of all exemption claims in the first years of data analysis. Most recently, it has 
been closer to two-thirds. There are many contributing factors to the precipitous increase in Exemption 7 claims, 
but the 1986 amendments stand as a major factor in that sharp incline. 
In analyzing the internal effects on Exemption 7, the changes are less readily distinguishable. When focusing on 
the Departments of Justice and Labor – the two departments to consistently track sub-exemptions from 1975 
forward – there are some notable fluctuations in administrative patterns, though not necessarily in the direction 
expected. The sub-exemptions altered by the reduced harm standard (that is, 7(A), 7(C), 7(D) and 7(F)) already 
provided the vast majority of Exemption 7 claims, totaling 90% in the twelve-year period prior to enactment. 
After enactment, and before the 1996 amendment, the four sub-exemptions are proportionally less likely to be 
used, comprising 88% of Exemption 7 claims. The 1986 amendments altered the language of three law 
enforcement sub-exemptions (that is, 7(D), 7(E) and 7(F)). Although the language appears to favor wider 
grounds for claims, the three sub-exemptions drop from 43% of all Exemption 7 claims to 33% after 
amendment. While all of the sub-exemptions find increased use after amendment, Exemption 7(C) experienced 
the largest jump in claims, from 41% of Exemption 7 claims pre-amendment to 46% after. In 2015 and 2016, 
Exemption 7(C) accounted for 48% of all law enforcement exemption claims. Remarkably, in the two most 
recent years of data, 28% of all FOIA exemptions are the law enforcement’s personal privacy sub-exemption. 
Exemption 7(E) has witnessed surging numbers of claims as well. After the Milner Court abolished High 2 in 
2011, the Department of Homeland Security issued hundreds of thousands of Exemption 7(E) claims, raising the 
percentage of claims from the low teens prior to the decision to 26% of all exemption claims in 2015 and 2016. 
Exclusions 
There is no definitive method for tabulating the exclusions codified in the 1986 amendment. These responses 
would manifest themselves in annual reporting as “no records’ closures, indistinguishable from all other 
legitimate “no records” responses. However, there is evidence suggesting the exclusions have made a 
substantial impact in “no records” data. In the years before the amendment, there were 10,218 “no records” 
closures among cabinet-level departments in 1984. Three years later, that number was 20,014, a 95% increase in 
“no records” response claims. In 1990, there were 31,811 “no records” response claims, amounting to a nearly 
three-fold increase in the number of “no records” responses since 1984. 
While there is no accounting, internally or publicly, for exclusions use, the trends suggest a highly plausible 
connection between the introduction of the exclusions and a considerable spike in “no records” closures. While 
the impact is very difficult to estimate, it does not appear to be a temporary phenomenon. Before the Clause C 
amendment, 5% of requests processed received a “no records” response; after the 1986 amendment, the figure 
is double, 10%. From 2008 until 2016, it is higher still at 12% of all requests processed. In the year 2016, 15% of 
requests processed concluded with a “no records” response. 
Discussion 
Analysis of the annual report data documents the immediate and lasting impact on access to law enforcement 
records. The data show the amendments to have been successful in realizing the stated objectives, 
demonstrating both a sustained increase in Exemption 7 claims and the establishment of an administrative 
procedure that quietly discards requests. The overstated threat of sophisticated requesters, along with federal 
alarmism over illicit drug use, produced statutory changes that have crippled the public’s ability to oversee law 
enforcement. 
Exemption 7 
Writing from the vantage of the early 1990s, James T. O’Reilly called the 1986 amendments, while not 
inappropriate in their objective, the nadir of federal law enforcement transparency: 
After the effort to expand public accountability for the law enforcement agencies, in counterpoint to the 
abuses of Watergate, a sweeping revision of exemption (b)(7) was undertaken. Today, after the 1986 
amendments to the exemption and the Supreme Court decisions… the FOIA, in its wisdom and majesty, 
permits futile and expensive requests to be made for records that may or may not be there at the 
agency but will be withheld nonetheless. From a security-oriented standpoint, that is how it should be. 
From an accountability standpoint, the rights of open government advocates in the law enforcement 
arena are at their lowest ebb in history as the FOIA reaches its quarter-century mark.181 
Whether law enforcement accountability has further declined since O’Reilly’s observation is up for debate, but 
the statutory changes remain, and annual report figures suggest the decreased access to law enforcement 
records continues unabated. Expansive categories of law enforcement records are simply out of reach. Whole 
policing functions are entirely unknowable. Exemption 7 is of such a magnitude, broader FOIA concerns are 
pulled into its gravitational field. Personal privacy, a social concern so pervasive that it has nearly swallowed 
FOIA, accounts for 30% of all FOIA exemptions via Exemption 6 alone. Exemption 7(C) accounts for 28% of all 
exemption claims, meaning nearly three of five exemption claims are privacy-oriented. Exemption 7 contains its 
own rendition of deliberative process182 with on-going investigation (that is, Exemption 7(A)), requiring 
appellants to challenge when a decision has been made or an investigation closed, respectively. Justice Elena 
Kagan’s interpretation of the 1986 amendments effectively usurped High 2, bringing the vast majority of 
Exemption 2 claims under the umbrella of Exemption 7. And these extensions were found welcome under the 
law enforcement exemption due to the permissive statutory language, inflated congressional justification and a 
deferential court. 
Exemption 7 exists at the nexus of two critical elements of governance, the public’s right to know and the 
authority and latitude to ably police the public. As the literal and figurative point of impact between the 
government and the governed, law enforcement duties are inherently controversial. Naturally, the public has 
been suspicious of such powers and has demanded accountability and transparency in policing. Certainly, law 
enforcement information is a prevalent subject of requests, but the volume of Exemption 7 claims, the breadth 
of Exemption 7 rationales and the deference shown by federal courts demonstrate an exemption that has 
exceeded its purpose, undermining the entirety of the FOIA mechanism. The study’s data demonstrate the 1986 
amendment to have been a pivotal point for present-day law enforcement secrecy. The federal record suggests 
the motives behind the amendment were fear-based and grounded in a public policy rapidly losing support. 
In 1989, Lotte Feinberg produced a retrospective of FOIA during the Reagan years and arrived at conclusions as 
grim as O’Reilly, documenting an impact on police and intelligence transparency just three years after the 
amendments.183 Feinberg called the amendments and influence on law enforcement transparency a savvy, 
coordinated attack by the Reagan White House,184 an effort not above exploiting less than credible evidence. 
Not unlike congressional testimony where the senators regularly referenced a self-interested FBI in making their 
case, Feinberg cited Senator Hatch’s chief counsel in suggesting some evidence mustered in support of 
amendment may have been less than scientifically valid or exaggerated, particularly in overstating the threat of 
sophisticated or malicious requesters.185 Feinberg’s well-connected observations continue to hold credibility and 
the growth of Exemption 7 has also shown no signs of slackening. 
Exclusions 
There is no knowing the degree of impact made by the amendment of exclusions, and this is perhaps the most 
troublesome aspect of their use. It allows for no recourse and no understanding on the part of the requester. It 
is an overt exploitation of an existing loophole, creating not only a relatively simple circumvention of the original 
statutory intent, and one that affords little chance of purposeful appeal, but one that goes unnoticed, buried 
under the clerical details of implementation. 
Christine Walz and Charles Tobin described the exclusions this way: “The Reagan-era addition to the FOIA, on its 
face, provides the government with a license to lie. The exclusions were intended to be narrow, yet the precise 
parameters of the exclusions remain undefined.”186 Walz and Tobin’s concerns are grounded in the fundamental 
problem of recourse. What makes the false “no records” responses especially troublesome is the practice’s 
ability to leech civic trust from the FOIA process. Adequacy of search represents an essential element of the 
access to government records procedure, one that requires faith, inherently resists oversight and cannot be 
substantially appealed. Without detailed knowledge of storage, both physical and digital (including different 
databases and file systems), it is exceptionally difficult to determine whether a good faith effort has been 
conducted, much less whether the reported effort matches the true effort. There is no substantial method for 
challenging such a response. “No records” responses are a dead-end in the process and challenging them 
amounts to little more than a shot in the dark. Such responses are inherently problematic,187 but to append an 
already difficult aspect of the FOIA to agency ability to flatly lie is wildly inappropriate. Providing statutory cover 
for a broad range of requests with no internal accountability turns a civic right into meaningless sport. O’Reilly 
compared the amendment of exclusions to just that: “So, like the child’s card game, ‘go, fish,’” the process of 
seeking documents now becomes a more blind groping process for requesters.”188 
Judicial Interpretation 
Perhaps the most notable outcome of the amendments though was the change in the court’s tenor regarding 
law enforcement secrecy. In the years leading up to the amendments, federal courts were committed to refining 
the threshold, proposing different tests and requiring a “rational nexus.” After the amendments, courts 
continued parsing and interpreting the statutory changes but a generally more permissive approach to law 
enforcement secrecy materialized. And it was inaugurated by Reporters Committee, a decision that was striking 
largely due to the audacity of its conclusions. The decision was clearly influenced by the 1986 amendments, 
directly identifying the legislature’s purpose as providing law enforcement more flexibility and margin in 
withholding records. Justice Stevens’s justification for “practical obscurity” drew from the same playbook as the 
Reagan administration’s “database campaign”189 and early efforts to enshrine the Mosaic theory. Both trafficked 
in a fear of requesters abusing new digital technology and proposed regressive reactions that removed records 
from the FOIA’s reach. The Reporters Committee Court set a new direction for the FOIA after acknowledging the 
legislative history of the 1986 amendments. 
Of course, growing public concern over privacy is a significant factor to changes in Exemption 7 interpretation 
and the bold precedents of Reporters Committee are privacy-centric, but in taking into consideration Halstuk 
and Chamberlin’s trio of FOIA privacy cases, there is an observable difference in the Court’s approach 
in Washington Post than the post-1986 amendments cases, Reporters Committee and Favish. And 
while Washington Post was solely an Exemption 6 case, Justice Rehnquist turned to the legislative history prior 
to original enactment, citing the intensely personal nature of the records in question. The Court determined the 
case rather narrowly, suggesting personal records remained personal no matter the location of their filing. 
The Reporters Committee and Favish Courts were much bolder, staking out new FOIA ground and establishing 
derivative privacy rights. 
Reporters Committee is rightly recognized as a landmark case in FOIA adjudication, but the decision was made 
possible by a nearly decade of fears sewed by the White House and Congress, fears that law enforcement had 
been neutered by excessive transparency. In order to fix the drug problem, law enforcement needed a freer 
hand, and part and parcel with increased liberty to go after the bad guys was a corresponding revision of 
transparency. The 1986 FOIA amendments were a statutory product of the War of Drugs, as was the Reporters 
Committee decision. Both are the result of the exaggeration of a social problem, one that has largely been 
debunked, yet Exemption 7 claims remain staggeringly high and exclusions exists as an unseen warren of law 
enforcement secrecy. 
Conclusion 
Ben Montgomery, of the Tampa Bay Times, compiled a database on police discharge of weapons in 
Florida.190 Surprisingly, analysis showed weapons were not being used more frequently. Instead, it was learned 
that technology, via more pervasive lapel and dash cams, had increased public awareness of police violence. 
Through Florida’s relatively strong freedom of information law,191 Montgomery was able to demonstrate that 
police discharge of weapons was no more common in 2009 than in 2014. His reporting showed police discharge 
of weapons to be an enduring issue, not a recent evolution brought to light by the accumulation of national, 
heavily discussed police violence episodes. The essential takeaway from such a journalistic endeavor – aside 
from the empirical insight provided by access to government records – was the acknowledgement of a pre-
existing police issue spurred by a general lack of transparency. Police discharge of guns had not changed over 
the short period of analysis, but the public was unaware due to the difficulty in acquiring law enforcement 
records. Transparency worked in this case due to Montgomery’s dogged efforts, the resources of the Times, and 
Florida’s strong access laws, but a federal duplication of the dataset would be markedly more difficult, if not 
impossible. 
The effort to dismantle law enforcement scrutiny began the year President Reagan entered the White House. 
The widely discredited War on Drugs had direct and clearly legible influence on the origins and the language of 
the 1986 amendments. The White House and Senator Hatch had unmistakable designs on expanding the power 
of law enforcement and shrinking police transparency and built and marketed a fear-based justification that 
used exaggerated reports on the threat of drug users and hobbled police. Hatch mounted a steady campaign of 
bills, hearings and scholarship aimed singularly at diminishing oversight and scrutiny of federal law enforcement. 
The early bills would have amounted to an overhaul of the FOIA structure on par with the 1974 amendments’ 
realization of modern FOIA function. But after a succession of the Hatch-sponsored bills failed, Congress pared 
away a number of provisions to realize the core – a significant broadening of Exemption 7 and the establishment 
of exclusions – which were included as a rider on the last day of a congressional session.192 The fee waivers were 
seen as compensation to the pro-transparency crowd and media rights organizations.193 The 1986 amendments’ 
realization represent cynical, agenda-first politics, and federal courts quickly grasped the new legislation’s 
intent, reading the changes as a clear signal for more deference to law enforcement secrecy. The unpopular 
amendments have resulted in demonstrably crippling results for law enforcement transparency, observable 
both anecdotally and in FOIA use and implementation data. 
FOIA is both a simple ability and a grand right; a tool for providing citizens access to government records and a 
public position signaling government commitment to transparency. On both fronts, the 1986 FOIA Reform Act 
stands as a rebuke to citizens’ ability and right to know about their government. The data demonstrate clear 
evidence of diminished access to one of society’s most powerful entities. There is no valid evidence able to 
connect such general and complex concepts as transparency and police behavior, but the present crisis in law 
enforcement seems at least tangentially tied to decades of opacity. In exploring the legislative commentary and 
executive messaging, a clear and cynical turn away from transparency occurred in the 1980s, motivated by a 
fear of the production, sale and use of illicit drugs, and as a result the public’s right to know has been irreparably 
damaged. 
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